Security Resources

⌘K
  1. Home
  2. Security Resources
  3. Cloud & Container Securit...
  4. AWS IAM Least Privilege and Permission Boundaries

AWS IAM Least Privilege and Permission Boundaries

AWS Identity & Access Management (IAM) Hardening Playbook
Practical guide to eliminating wildcard permissions, implementing IAM permission boundaries, setting up condition keys, and configuring AWS Organizations Service Control Policies (SCPs).

1. The Anti-Pattern: Wildcard Administrator Access


Developers frequently assign over-permissive policies (such as AdministratorAccess or s3:*) to application roles to avoid permission errors during development. When an application workload suffers from SSRF or RCE, attackers inherit complete cloud account control.

// Vulnerable IAM Policy: Wildcard Action and Resource
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "*",
      "Resource": "*"
    }
  ]
}

2. Hardened Least-Privilege IAM Policy


Hardened policies restrict actions to specific API calls, pinpoint specific ARNs, and enforce condition keys (such as requiring TLS and MFA):

// Secure IAM Policy: Scoped actions, pinned ARNs, and TLS enforcement
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "AllowScopedDocumentReadWrite",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "s3:GetObject",
        "s3:PutObject"
      ],
      "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::company-production-documents-2026/*",
      "Condition": {
        "Bool": {
          "aws:SecureTransport": "true"
        }
      }
    },
    {
      "Sid": "DenyUnencryptedObjectUploads",
      "Effect": "Deny",
      "Action": "s3:PutObject",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::company-production-documents-2026/*",
      "Condition": {
        "StringNotEquals": {
          "s3:x-amz-server-side-encryption": "aws:kms"
        }
      }
    }
  ]
}

3. Implementing IAM Permission Boundaries


Permission boundaries act as maximum permission guardrails. Even if a developer creates a role with Action: *, the role's effective permissions can never exceed the attached boundary:

// Developer Permission Boundary: Disallows IAM escalation and disallows cloudtrail deletion
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "AllowedServicesBoundary",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "s3:*",
        "lambda:*",
        "dynamodb:*",
        "sqs:*"
      ],
      "Resource": "*"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "ExplicitDenySecurityModifications",
      "Effect": "Deny",
      "Action": [
        "iam:CreatePolicyVersion",
        "iam:DeleteRolePermissionsBoundary",
        "cloudtrail:DeleteTrail",
        "cloudtrail:StopLogging"
      ],
      "Resource": "*"
    }
  ]
}

4. Auditing IAM with AWS CLI

# Find IAM users with active access keys older than 90 days
aws iam list-users --query 'Users[*].[UserName]' --output text | while read user; do
  aws iam list-access-keys --user-name "$user" --query "AccessKeyMetadata[?Status=='Active'].[UserName,AccessKeyId,CreateDate]" --output text
done

# Generate IAM credential report for offline security analysis
aws iam generate-credential-report
aws iam get-credential-report --query 'Content' --output text | base64 -d > iam_credential_report.csv